Abstract-A PAKR (Password-Authenticated Key Retrieval) protocol and its multi-server system allow one party (say, client), who has a memorable password, to retrieve a long-term static key in an exchange of messages with at least one other party (say, server) that has a private key associated with the password. In this paper, we analyze the only PAKR (named as PKRS-1) standardized in IEEE 1363.2 [9] and its multi-server system (also, [12] ) by showing that any passive/ active attacker can find out the client's password and the static key with off-line dictionary attacks. This result contradicts the security claims made for PKRS-1 (see Clause 10.2 of IEEE 1363.2 [9]).
static keys against server compromises. That is, even if an attacker takes full control of up to n À 1 servers, the attacker will not be able to verify a single guess for the password and get any information about the static key. In order to prevent off-line dictionary attacks, PAKR protocols in [5] rely on a prior server-authenticated secure channel such as SSL/TLS which means it may be vulnerable to webspoofing/phishing attacks. In [12] , Jablon proposed a PAKR protocol using multiple servers which does not need a prior serverauthenticated secure channel. Also, see [2] for another PAKR based on the unique blind signature [1] . Differently from passwordenabled PKI [13] , [15] , [16] , [17] utilizing PAKE protocols, the retrieved static key in PAKR [2] , [5] , [12] is derived from both the client's password and the server's private key. 1 
Our Contributions
Based on [5] , [12] , PKRS-1 (Password-authenticated Key Retrieval Scheme, version 1) has been standardized and was included in IEEE 1363.2 standard [9] . In this paper, we revisit PKRS-1 and its multi-server system (also, [12] ) to show that any passive/active attacker can find out the client's password and the (long-term) static key with off-line dictionary attacks. This result contradicts the security claims made for PKRS-1 (see Clause 10.2 of IEEE 1363.2 [9] ). Note that PKRS-1 is the only Password-Authenticated Key Retrieval in IEEE 1363.2 standard [9] .
Notation
Here, we explain some notation to be used throughout this paper. Let G be a finite, cyclic subgroup of prime order q of the multiplicative group Z $ p where p ¼ aq þ 1 is a prime and a is an integer. Let g a and g b be two distinct generators of G in which the group operation is denoted multiplicatively. Note that an exponential relationship between g a and g b should be unknown. The ðp; q; g a ; g b Þ are public to everyone and ðp; qÞ are called domain parameters. In the aftermath, all the subsequent arithmetic operations are performed in modulo p unless otherwise stated.
Let k be the security parameter for hash functions. Let f0; 1g $ denote the set of finite binary strings and f0; 1g k the set of binary strings of length k. We use two different hash functions H and H where H : f0; 1g $ ! Z $ q and H : f0; 1g $ ! f0; 1g k . Let KDF be the key derivation function, which can be instantiated with a secure oneway hash function H (see Sections 12.3 and 11 of [9] ), and P be the key derivation parameter for KDF. Also, let A; B be the concatenation of bit strings of A and B in f0; 1g $ . Let C and S be the identities of client and server, respectively, with each identity ID 2 f0; 1g $ .
PKRS-1
In this section, we describe PKRS-1 (Clause 10.2 and Annex D.2.2.3.4 of IEEE 1363.2 [9] ) based on [5] , [12] in detail. The PKRS-1 consists of key establishment operation phase and key confirmation operation phase for an invoking application.
Key Establishment Operation
Whenever client C needs to retrieve a static key with the assistance of server S, they execute the below key establishment operation over insecure networks. Before this operation, client C just remembers his/her password pw and server S has its private key u 2 ½1; q À 1 that corresponds to the password pw. 1. In addition, the retrieved static key can be used to encrypt the client's signature/decryption keys for a later use.
2. Note that the server's private key does not, in itself, contain sufficient information to allow the server to determine the client's password or the retrieved static key. establishment operation, client C and server S exchange values, and then client C retrieves a static key K derived from both the client's password pw and the server's associated private key u.
Step 1: First, client C computes a generator value R g a Á g
HðpwÞ b
(by REDP-2 (Random Element Derivation Primitive, version 2) in Clause 8.2.18 of IEEE 1363.2 [9] ) from his/her password pw. Also, the client selects a random secret s from the range ½1; q À 1 and computes a blinded password value W C R s . Then, client C sends the first message ðC; W C Þ to server S. C ! S : ðC; W C Þ
Step 2: After receiving ðC; W C Þ, server S checks if W C is in ½1; p À 1. If not, it outputs "invalid" and stops (Server validation 1). The server also checks whether W C is a valid value or not (i.e., the order check of W C ). If ðW C Þ q 6 1, it outputs "invalid" and stops (Server validation 2). 3 Otherwise, server S computes a permuted blinded password value W S ðW C Þ u with its private key u. Then, server S sends the second message ðS; W S Þ to client C.
S ! C : ðS; W S Þ
Step 3: After receiving ðS;
If not, it outputs "invalid" and stops (Client validation 1). The client also checks whether W S is a valid value or not (i.e., the order check of W S ). If ðW S Þ q 6 1, it outputs "invalid" and stops (Client validation 2). Otherwise, client C computes a permuted password value Z ðW S Þ 1=s with the secret s, and then derives a static key K ¼ KDFðZ; P Þ from Z where P is the key derivation parameter.
Key Confirmation Operation
In general, any invoking application that uses the key establishment operation of Section 2.1 is required to execute a key confirmation operation. The following key confirmation operation is included in Annex D.2.2.3.4.2 of IEEE 1363.2 [9] , but it is not described in [5] , [12] . 4 As in NOTE 6 in Clause 10.2.2 of IEEE 1363.2 [9] , this operation is important in order to prevent disclosure of the client's password pw to other parties (particularly, an attacker who impersonates server S). Before this operation, server S has a key confirmation value V S ¼ HðZÞ. During the key confirmation operation, client C confirms that the permuted password value Z (or equivalently, the static key K derived from Z) is correct before revealing any information about Z to other parties.
Step 4: The server S sends the key confirmation value V S to client C.
Step 5: After receiving V S , client C checks correctness of the permuted password value Z by verifying if V S is equal to HðZÞ.
SECURITY ANALYSIS OF PKRS-1
In this section, we analyze PKRS-1 of Section 2 in terms of security of the client's password as well as the static key. According to Clause 10.2 of IEEE 1363.2 [9] , it is clearly stated that PKRS-1 prevents both an active attacker (who impersonates the client) and a passive attacker (who eavesdrops the values exchanged between the legitimate client and server) from being able to derive the client's password pw, the server's private key u, or the retrieved static key K, even with off-line dictionary attacks on the password.
An Attack on PKRS-1
Here, we show an attack on PKRS-1 where a passive/active attacker can find out the client's password pw and the retrieved static key K with off-line dictionary attacks. The success probability of this attack is 1.
Consider an attacker A who impersonates client C without knowing the password pw. The attacker executes the following key establishment operation of Section 2.1 with server S.
Step 
After eavesdropping the key confirmation value V S between client C and server S, the attacker tests if V S is equal to Hðg [9] , PKRS-1 is extended for a multi-server system [5] , [12] where the key shares established between client C and each server S i are combined into the static key. However, the above attack of Section 3.1 can be readily applied to the multi-server system of PKRS-1. For more concreteness, we show that PAKR using multiple servers [12] is insecure in Section 5.
PAKR USING MULTIPLE SERVERS
In this section, we describe PAKR using multiple servers (for short, PAKR-M) [12] in detail where client C uses his/her password pw to retrieve the static key K from key shares that have been distributed and stored with n servers S i ð1 i nÞ. By using multiple servers, PAKR-M and [5] can reduce vulnerabilities such as exposure of passwords and/or static keys due to (up to n À 1) server compromises. Note that PAKR-M mainly differs from [5] in that the former does not require a prior server-authenticated secure channel (e.g., SSL/TLS) between client C and each server S i . The PAKR-M consists of enrollment phase and authenticated retrieval (i.e., key establishment plus key confirmation) phase. See Sections 4.2 and 4.3 of [12] for the specific description of PAKR-M.
Notation for PAKR-M
Here, we explain additional notation for PAKR-M. The PAKR-M uses specific domain parameters ðp; qÞ where p ¼ aq þ 1 is a secure prime such that ða=2Þ is also a prime. Let ðSigK; VerKÞ be the signature and verification key pair for digital signatures, and Sign SigK ðmsgÞ be the signature of message msg with signature key SigK. Also, let E K ðÁÞ and D K ðÁÞ be the encryption/decryption with symmetric key K satisfying msg ¼ D K ðE K ðmsgÞÞ.
Enrollment
In the enrollment phase, client C registers a set of credentials to each server S i ð1 i nÞ. This phase should be done securely and is performed only once between client C and server S i . First, client C who remembers his/her password pw computes a generator value R g a Á g
(see Section 4.3 of [12] ). For server S i , the client selects a random private key u i from the range ½1; q À 1 and computes a permuted password value (i.e., key share) Z i R u i . By combining all Z i , client C derives a static key K ¼ HðZ 1 ; Z 2 ; . . . ; Z n Þ and a key confirmation value V S ¼ HðK; RÞ. Second, the client generates a signature/verification key pair ðSigK; VerKÞ for digital signatures, and an encryption E K ðSigKÞ of SigK with the static key K. Finally, client C registers a set of credentials ðC; u i ; VerK; E K ðSigKÞ; V S Þ to each server S i .
After the enrollment phase, client C just remembers the password pw and server S i has the set of credentials ðC; u i ; VerK; E K ðSigKÞ; V S Þ.
Authenticated Retrieval
In the authenticated retrieval phase, client C retrieves the static key K (from key shares Z i ) with the assistance of server S i ð1 i nÞ over insecure networks whenever K is needed.
Step 1: First, client C computes the generator value R g a Á g HðpwÞ b from his/her password pw. Also, the client selects a random secret s from the range ½1; q À 1 and computes a blinded password value W C R s . Then, client C sends the first message ðC; W C Þ to all servers S i .
C ! S i : ðC; W C Þ
Step 2: After receiving ðC; W C Þ, server S i adds ðC; W C ; VerKÞ to the list List i that is used to distinguish honest client's behaviors from on-line dictionary attacks on the password. The server computes a permuted blinded password value W S i ðW C Þ u i with its private key u i . Then, server S i sends the second message ðS i ; W S i ; E K ðSigKÞ; V S Þ to client C.
S i ! C : ðS i ; W S i ; E K ðSigKÞ; V S Þ C ! S i : s
Step 4: After receiving s, server S i checks whether the signature s is valid or not with the verification key VerK. If s is valid, server S i removes ðC; W C ; VerKÞ from the list List i . Otherwise, the W C is counted as an on-line dictionary attack on the password pw.
SECURITY ANALYSIS OF PAKR-M
Similarly to Section 3.1, we show an attack on PAKR-M where an active attacker can find out the client's password pw and the retrieved static key K with off-line dictionary attacks. Of course, the success probability of this attack is 1.
Consider an attacker A who impersonates client C without knowing the password pw. The attacker executes the following authenticated retrieval of Section 4.3 with server S i ð1 i nÞ.
Step 1': First, attacker A computes a generator value R 0 g a Á Step 1": Again, attacker A computes a generator value R 00 g a Á g
Hðpw 00 Þ b with another guessed password pw 00 ð6 ¼ pw 0 Þ. Also, the attacker selects a random secret s 2 ½1; q À 1 and computes W 00 C ðR 00 Þ s . Then, attacker A sends ðC; W 00 C Þ to all servers S i .
A ! S i : ðC; W 00 C Þ
Step 2": Same as
Step 2 of Section 4.3
Step 3": After receiving ðS i ; W 
Now, the attacker tests if the key confirmation value V S is equal to 
